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STUDENTS' RECORDS:
DO THE 1999 IDEA* REGULATIONS MANDATE
THAT SCHOOLS COMPLY WITH FERPA?**
Thomas A. Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel***
INTRODUCTION
Dr. Carla Culver, the principal of Anytown High School, is
sitting in her office, examining the files on Dawn Davenport and
Fred Flynn. After Dawn and Fred, two of Anytown High School's
special education students, vandalized the school's computer lab,
Dr. Culver called the police. The police, who just left with Dawn
and Fred, asked Dr. Culver to send the two students' records down
to the police station. Dr. Culver is worried. She knows that federal
law protects education records from most disclosures, except under
certain circumstances. She also knows that special education
students enjoy the same protections. On the other hand, 1997
amendments to one of the key special education statutes requires
her to turn over certain records to authorities when she reports a
* Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat.
175 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
** Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat.
57 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
*** Thomas A. Mayes, J.D., University of Iowa, 1996, is a graduate research
fellow in education at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, where Dr.
Perry A. Zirkel, J.D., Ph.D., University of Connecticut, 1976, 1972; LL.M., Yale
University, 1983, is the Iacocca Professor of Education. Mr. Mayes was formerly
a staff attorney with Legal Services Corporation of Iowa's Waterloo Regional
Office. Dr. Zirkel is the co-chair of the Pennsylvania Special Education Appeals
Panel. Mr. Mayes's fellowship is supported, in part, by a grant from the United
States Department of Education, Office of Special Education Programs
(84.325N).
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special education student's alleged criminal activity. Dr. Culver
wants to follow the law. What should she do?
The preceding hypothetical illustrates a common concern of
contemporary educators. As a result of the 1997 amendments to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),' questions
arise regarding the IDEA's interrelationship with the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA").2 These questions
' Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1487 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). The purpose of the Act was "to ensure
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living."
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Under the IDEA, participant states agree to provide
a free appropriate public education to children with disabilities in exchange for
federal financial assistance. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
203 (1982) (holding that "[tihe Act's [then called the Education for All
Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976 & Supp. IV)] 'free appropriate public
education' provision is satisfied when the state provides personalized instruction
with sufficient support services to permit a handicapped child to benefit
educationally from that instruction ... [and s]uch instruction and services must
be provided at public expense"); Dixie Snow Huefner, Judicial Review of the
Special Educational Program Requirements Under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been and Where Should We Be
Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 483, 484-88 (1991) (critiquing the case
law generated by the free appropriate public education provision and finding that
"courts have interpreted ambiguous statutory and regulatory provisions in ways
that are not consistent, especially with respect to the meaning of the requirement
that students with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education").
2 Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 57 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). As a general rule, FERPA (also referred to
as the Buckley Amendment) requires schools receiving federal assistance to
allow parents and students to access "education records" and prohibits schools
from disclosing these records without consent. FERPA, however, contains several
exceptions to this general rule. See generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Litigation
Involving FERPA, 110 EDUC. L. REP. 897 (West 1996) (reviewing "the case law
that has developed in litigating the rights of parents and students who have either
been denied access to student records or whose records have been released in
violation of FERPA"); Peter A. Walker & Sara J. Steinberg, Confidentiality of
Educational Records: Serious Risks for Parents and School Districts, 26 J. L. &
EDUC. 11 (1997) (addressing the problem of school districts disclosing the
sensitive information contained in special educational records and proposing
several measures they can take to protect the record's confidentiality); Perry A.
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primarily concern the extent of a school's IDEA-imposed obliga-
tion to convey a special education student's records to law
enforcement authorities when reporting the student's suspected
criminal activity.3 Enacted in part "to control the careless release
of educational information" by educational institutions,4 FERPA
sets limits on a school's ability to disclose education records
without the consent of the parents of all students5 -not just special
education students. Thus, FERPA seemingly restricts a school's
power to transmit a special education student's records to law
enforcement authorities. To resolve this apparent conflict between
FERPA's consent provision 6 and IDEA's disclosure requirement
(hereinafter "Section 1415(k)(9)"),7 the IDEA regulations require
Zirkel, Caught in the Collision: A Disabled Child's Right to Confidentiality and
the News Media's Right to "Sunshine," 117 EDUC. L. REP 429 (West 1997)
[hereinafter Zirkel, Caught in the Collision] (exploring the relationship between
FERPA and state open meetings and open records laws); John E. Theumann,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 112 A.L.R. FED. 1 (1993) (analyzing the state
and federal court decisions that have determined questions concerning the
validity, construction, or application of FERPA).
3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "[a]n agency
reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability shall ensure that copies
of the special education and disciplinary records of the child are transmitted [to]
. the appropriate authorities to whom it reports the crime"). A related
interpretative problem concerns the transfer of rights to an IDEA-eligible child
at the age of majority, including rights to review and release special education
records. If a state's age of majority is not eighteen, the age at which FERPA
rights shift from parent to student, the two statutes arguably conflict. See
generally Deborah Rebore & Perry Zirkel, Transfer of Rights Under the
Individuals with Disabilities [Education] Act: Adulthood with Ability or
Disability? 2000 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 33 (analyzing the status of the age of the
majority of students under IDEA).
4 Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Board of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga.
1993). For more information on FERPA's background, see infra Part IU.C,
discussing the policies underlying FERPA.
' 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6 Id.
' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). See Dixie Snow Huefner, The
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 122 EDUC. L.
REP. 1103, 1111 n.47 (West 1998) (noting the potential conflict between
FERPA's consent provision and IDEA's disclosure requirement).
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compliance with FERPA when releasing certain student records
after contacting law enforcement officials concerning a special
education student's criminal behavior.s
In attempting to apply the IDEA requirement of disclosing a
special education student's records to law enforcement officials,
questions arise as to whether there really is a conflict between
IDEA and FERPA and what weight, if any, should the IDEA
regulations be accorded. These important questions merit careful
attention. To find the answers, as in any case of statutory interpre-
tation, one first must closely examine the statutory text for
evidence of legislative intent.9 If the text is clear, the inquiry ends
in all but the most unusual cases.' ° Clearly establishing that the
best indicator of Congress' intent is the language Congress
employed, the Supreme Court has declared: "We have stated time
and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."'"
' 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(2) (1999). For more information, see Perry A.
Zirkel, Prosecuting Disabled Students: IDEA '97 Effectively Negates Chris L.,
THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR, June 4, 1999, at 6.
9 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (explaining
that the court's "first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the
particular dispute in the case").
'0 Id. (explaining that the "inquiry must cease if the statutory language is
unambiguous"). See also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
475 (1992) (explaining that "[i]n a statutory construction case, the beginning
point must be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity
to an issue[,] judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished"); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (explaining that "in the absence of a
'clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,' the language of the
statute itself 'must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive"') (quoting United States
v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)). For a brief summary of the extremely
exceptional factors that may cause a court to depart from a statute's plain
meaning (i.e., plain-meaning reading entirely defeats statutory purpose), see
National Coalition for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Defense Fund
v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1998).
" Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). See
also Mountain Home Sch. Dist. v. T.M.J. Builders, 858 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Ark.
1993) (explaining that "[t]he first rule in considering the meaning of a statute is
to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
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Frequently, however, a legislature lacks clarity of expression
and enacts an ambiguous statute. A statute is ambiguous if
reasonable persons may differ as to its meaning. 2 If the statutory
text is ambiguous, one then must engage in the methodical
application of well-settled canons of statutory construction 3 to the
problematic text, in a common-sense manner,1 4 with the ultimate
goal of illuminating murky legislative will. 5
accepted meaning in common language"); People v. Townsend, 62 Cal. App. 4th
1390, 1395 (Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that "[i]f there is no ambiguity or uncer-
tainty, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and there is no
need to resort to extrinsic indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative
history"); University of Iowa v. Dunbar, 590 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Iowa 1999)
(explaining that "[t]he intent of the legislature is the polestar of statutory
construction and is primarily to be ascertained based on the language employed
in the statute").
12 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 45.02 (5th ed. 1992). See also Stockbridge Sch. Dist. v. Department of Pub.
Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 550 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Wis. 1996)
(stating that parties who interpret a statute differently do not create ambiguity,
but that the Court has "recognized that different yet equally reasonable
interpretations by various decision-making bodies is indicative that a statute may
support more than one reasonable interpretation").
"3 Although the canons are occasionally subject to scholarly criticism, they
are routinely consulted by litigants and judges. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25-28 (1997)
(discussing the origins and purpose of canons in the legal system).
14 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 546-47 (1994)
(stating that the Supreme Court had responsibility to give "sensible content" to
statutory provision); Sweetman v. State Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 732
A.2d 144, 153-54 (Conn. 1999) (explaining that "[iun interpreting a statute,
common sense must be used ... [and that] the statute [is considered] as a whole
with a view toward reconciling its parts in order to obtain a sensible and rational
overall interpretation ... [and i]f a statute can be construed in several ways, we
will adopt the construction that is most reasonable").
"5 See generally Robert S. Summers, Statutory Interpretation in the United
States, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 407 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991) (focusing on the interpretational
practices of the Supreme Court during the decade, 1980-90). Canons of
construction are aids to ascertaining legislative intent. Connecticut Nat'l Bank,
503 U.S. at 253. As such, they may not be used to defeat legislative will. The
canons "must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
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Some commentators assert that, under the IDEA, FERPA's
constraints do not apply in these situations. These commentators
include Professor Susan Clark, who wrote: "[w]hen principals
report crimes committed by students with disabilities, copies of
special education and disciplinary records must be transmitted to
the authorities; doing so does not violate confidentiality provisions
of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act."' 16 Further-
more, at least one special education hearing officer concluded that
the IDEA's crime reporting provisions were an "exception" to
FERPA. 17
This Article argues that these authorities have not correctly
stated the law because FERPA and the IDEA's disclosure require-
ments are capable of coexistence and IDEA regulations command
this result. According to IDEA regulations, school officials must
comply with FERPA when turning over records after reporting a
special education student's suspected criminal activity in compli-
16 Susan G. Clark, The Principal, Discipline, and the IDEA, NASSP BULL.,
Nov. 1999, at 1, 7 (emphasis added). This Article disagrees only with the portion
of Professor Clark's article that covers student records. The balance of Professor
Clark's treatment is a brief, but accurate, summary of the IDEA's discipline
requirements.
17 Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 1118, 1122 (Tex. SEA 1998). This
decision was issued prior to the effective date of the final IDEA regulations.
Prior to the effective date of the regulations, two other administrative decisions
discussed section 1415(k)(9)(B), but they have little instructive value. One
decision did not concern the disclosure of any arguably protected records; thus,
the reference to section 1415(k)(9)(B) appears to be gratuitous. Cabot Sch. Dist.,
29 IDELR 300, 301 (Ark. SEA 1998). In the other case, the disclosure of
records, which was to a juvenile probation officer after the commencement of
juvenile proceedings, may have been permissible under one of FERPA's
exceptions, but the hearing officer did not pursue this line of analysis. See
Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 30 IDELR 215 (Ala. SEA 1999). See also infra
notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing the FERPA exceptions).
After the final IDEA regulations became effective in May 1999, only two
administrative or judicial decisions cited the regulation in question. See Onteora
Cent. Sch. Dist., 31 IDELR 203 (N.Y. SEA 1999) (regulations would not have
changed outcome per review officer); Pottsdown Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 651, 653




ance with section 1415(k)(9). 8 This regulation is a reasonable
reading of FERPA and the IDEA and, consequently, a permissible
exercise of rule-making power by the United States Department of
Education in implementing the IDEA.19 In addition, ignoring
FERPA's commands under such circumstances is very risky
business because its plain regulatory language provides for federal
enforcement actions against FERPA violators. 20 Furthermore,
courts have imposed liability on schools for damages to students
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of FERPA confidentiality.21
In anticipation of challenges to the validity of IDEA regulations
implementing the crime reporting provisions, this Article analyzes
the relevant statutory and regulatory texts. In Part I, the Article
examines the language of the statutes and regulations, including the
extent of the Department of Education's power to promulgate
regulations under the IDEA. Part II of this Article examines
whether the applicable texts are capable of simultaneous existence.
In Part III, the Article analyzes whether common principles of
statutory construction and public policy considerations offer any
guidance in understanding the texts at issue. This article concludes
that the regulation in question is valid. Schools must comply with
FERPA when transmitting a special education student's records to
authorities under section 1415(k)(9)(b).
" 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(2) (1999) (providing that "[a]n agency reporting
a crime under this section may transmit copies of the child's special education
and disciplinary records only to the extent that the transmission is permitted by
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act").
'9 See infra Part L.A (discussing the interpretive powers Congress granted to
the United States Department of Education to implement and enforce IDEA's
requirements).
20 If a school violates FERPA, it risks federal enforcement actions, including
termination of federal financial assistance through the Department of Education's
Family Policy Compliance Office. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f) (1994); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 99.60-.67 (1999).
21 Under the prevailing judicial view a school may face liability for damages
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Mawdsley, supra note 2
(stating that because courts have held that FERPA does not create a private cause
of action, both parents and students have been more successful suing under
section 1983); Zirkel, Caught in the Collision, supra note 2, at 430-32 (analyzing
section 1983 cases where the news media requests information about a special
education student and the parents assert confidentiality over that information).
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I. THE INTERPRETIVE PROBLEM POSED BY DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE IDEA
The difficulty associated with section 1415(k)(9)(B) and its
corresponding regulations is revealed when one considers how a
school may transmit records as required by the IDEA and still
comply with FERPA. To understand the IDEA-FERPA relationship,
one must begin with the texts of the statutes and regulations
themselves.22 First, section 1415(k)(9)(B) states that "[a]n agency
reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability shall
ensure that copies of the special education and disciplinary records
of the child are transmitted for consideration by the appropriate
authorities to whom it reports the crime.,,2' The corresponding
IDEA regulation repeats this language, 24 however, it contains
important additional language. The regulation provides that "[a]n
agency reporting a crime under this section may transmit copies of
the child's special education and disciplinary records only to the
extent that the transmission is permitted by the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act. '25 This additional regulatory language is
at the heart of the dispute over whether FERPA's confidentiality
provision applies within the context of the IDEA. Proponents of the
view that FERPA's confidentiality provision does not apply to
disclosure of records under the IDEA may argue that the power of
the United States Department of Education to issue regulations
does not extend so far as to allow it to impermissibly add a
22 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (stating
that the "first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case"); Estate of Cowart v. Nichols Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469,
475 (1992) (stating that one must begin with the language of the statute, and that
"when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's
meaning... is finished").
23 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). The text of the IDEA does
not identify the "appropriate authorities." If disclosures under section 1415(k)-
(9)(B), however, are subject to FERPA, the "appropriate authorities" would be
those entitled to receive the records under FERPA.
24 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(1) (1999).
25 Id. § 300.529(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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requirement not contained within the IDEA. This Article, however,
argues that the crime reporting requirement-section
1415(k)(9)--does not unambiguously reveal whether FERPA's
confidentiality provision should apply to the disclosure of records
under the IDEA. As such, the United States Department of
Education is charged with interpreting section 1415(k)(9)(B) and
adopting regulations that inform schools on how to implement the
IDEA's requirements. Further, this Article concludes that the
regulation implementing section 1415(k)(9)(B), which requires
schools to comply with FERPA before disclosing special education
students' records, is a legitimate exercise of the Department of
Education's rule-making power.
A. The United States Department of Education's Interpretive
Powers
Congress charged the United States Department of Education
with adopting regulations to implement and enforce the IDEA's
requirements.26 Under federal law, the Department's regulatory
powers include the implicit power to resolve ambiguities in
statutory language." When the language of a statute is clear, the
administering agency must apply the statute according to its plain
meaning.28 If there are reasonable differences in the statute's
26 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
27 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984). Pursuant to section 1417(b), Congress' narrow grant of
regulatory authority-i.e., its grant of power to regulate only as "necessary to
ensure that there is compliance with specific requirements of' the IDEA-is
nevertheless broad enough to include an implicit grant of power to resolve
ambiguities, should the "specific requirements" of the Act prove to be
ambiguous. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988). In contrast,
Congress could have granted the Department explicit power to resolve statutory
ambiguities by regulation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. The distinction has
greatest force when analyzing the apparently different standards for sustaining
subsequent regulation. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing
the court's application of the principle of deference to administrative interpreta-
tions).
28 See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents
of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463 n. 11 (1993) (concluding that "[b]ecause ... the
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meaning, however, the agency may resolve the dispute.29 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court of the United States, an agency's
regulatory construction of an ambiguous statute pursuant to an
implicit grant of authority is controlling if it is a "reasonable
interpretation" of the statute.30 An agency's construction of an
ambiguous statutory text need not be the best possible construction;
it need only be reasonable.31
In interpreting section 1415(k)(9) and the regulation providing
that schools must comply with FERPA before disclosing a special
education student's records to the appropriate authorities to whom
it reports crimes, the questions that arise are whether section
1415(k)(9)(B) is ambiguous and whether this regulation is an
unreasonable interpretation of the IDEA. When examining any
portion of the IDEA, one must read the statute as a whole.32
Specifically, section 1415(k)(9), the crime reporting provision, must
be read together with the rest of the IDEA. The IDEA, like every
meaning of the 1916 Act is plain ... we need not consider the 1916 Act's
legislative history ... [n]or need we consider, again because the statute's
meaning is unambiguous, what if any weight to accord the longstanding
assumption"); Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 476 (explaining that "[t]he control-
ling principle in this case is the basic and unexceptional rule that courts must
give effect to the clear meaning of statutes written"); Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979) (explaining that "[a]lthough an
agency's interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to some
deference, this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear
meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history").
29 Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987); Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843-44. The judiciary is especially inclined to defer to the
Department of Education's administrative construction of the IDEA. See Honig,
484 U.S. at 325 n.8.
30 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. In contrast, if the agency's legislative authority
to resolve statutory ambiguities is express, agency interpretations will be upheld
unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id.
The differing language suggests a different scope of judicial inquiry.
31 Id. at 843 n. 11. See also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S.
382, 389 (1998) (explaining that "the task that confronts us is to decide, not
whether the ... regulation represents the best interpretation of the statute, but
whether it represents a reasonable one").
32 Summers, supra note 15, at 413-14.
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other statute, may not be "read as a series of unrelated and isolated
provisions."33
B. Reading Section 1415(K)(9) in Context
Words used in a statute derive their meaning from their context,
which can only be determined by examining the surrounding
words, sentences, and sections.34 Thus, the meaning of section
1415(k)(9) cannot be determined in isolation from the remainder of
the IDEA. Although section 1415(k)(9), the IDEA's crime reporting
provision, commands school districts to "ensure" that certain
records are transmitted to law enforcement authorities, 35 20 U.S.C.
§ 1417(c) requires the Secretary of Education to "assure the
confidentiality" of records protected by FERPA 36 and 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a) requires states and local school districts to comply with
FERPA.37 These latter provisions are absolute because they create
no exceptions or limitations. Notwithstanding the lack of excep-
tions, there are many ways in which a school may "ensure ' 38 that
33 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
14 See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (explaining
that "[tihe plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole"); King v. St. Vincent's
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (explaining "that a statute is to be read as a
whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on
context").
3' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. V 1998).
36 Id. § 1417(c) (providing that "[t]he Secretary shall take appropriate action,
in accordance with the provisions of section 1232g... to assure the protection
of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable data, information, or records
collected by the Secretary and by State and local educational agencies").
37 Id. § 1412(a)(8) (providing that "[a]gencies in the State comply with
section 1417(c) of this title (relating to confidentiality of records and informa-
tion)").
38 When construing a statute, one initially presumes that the words in
question carry their ordinary meaning. See Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997). For that reason, it is customary to start with
dictionary definitions. See Summers, supra note 15, at 412. The term "ensure"
is defined as "to make sure or certain." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 458 (3d ed. 1993). The term is focused on outcomes, see id., but
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the required records are transmitted to law enforcement officials
while concomitantly complying with FERPA.
After reading these three provisions of the IDEA together,
Professor Clark's contention, that record disclosures pursuant to the
1997 IDEA amendments are not subject to FERPA,3 9 is subject to
question. This is because, at best, the relationship of the pertinent
clauses is unclear. That is, the plain language of section
1415(k)(9)(B), read in context, does not clearly and unambiguously
speak to whether this crime reporting provision is subject to
FERPA's confidentiality provision. Consequently, the Department's
regulation requiring that schools comply with FERPA before
disclosing special education students' records to the appropriate
authorities to whom it reports crimes is sustainable so long as it is
a reasonable answer to the interpretative question. The remainder
of this Article focuses on the issue of whether the Department of
Education's regulation implementing section 1415(k)(9) is reason-
able.
II. FERPA AND THE IDEA MAY COEXIST EFFECTIVELY
Under a fundamental principle of statutory construction, courts
are required, where possible, to harmonize statutes if they are at all
capable of coexistence.4 ° Courts will not, unless absolutely
necessary, assign statutory language a meaning that will render any
silent as to methods. See Corey H. v. Board of Educ., 995 F. Supp. 900, 914-15
(N.D. 111. 1998) (noting that state board of education had many ways to "ensure"
that local school districts complied with the IDEA).
9 Clark, supra note 16, at 7.
4 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533
(1995). Like any other canon of construction, this rule yields to a statute's plain
meaning. See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253
(1992) (while explaining this rule, noting that "canons of construction are no
more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of statutes").
In Smith v. Wheaton, a federal district court resolved a potential conflict between
FERPA and the IDEA, regarding the transfer of records to a student's new
school, by engaging in analysis similar to that used in the present article. See
Smith v. Wheaton, 29 IDELR 200, 204-05 (D. Conn. 1998) (resolving a potential
conflict between FERPA and the IDEA).
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portion of a statute meaningless, redundant, or inoperative." If
two statutes cannot be harmonized, then courts resolve the deadlock
by referring to other rules of statutory construction. For example,
the more recent or more specific statute will take priority over an
older or more general statute.42
The crime reporting language of section 1415(k)(9)(B), which
requires schools to "ensure" disclosure of certain records, may be
harmonized with FERPA. Thus, the Department of Education's
regulation requiring schools to comply with FERPA is reasonable
and must govern the application of the IDEA. This is because
FERPA's broad-brushed rule prohibiting schools from disclosing
education records without consent is limited by several exemptions
and exceptions,43 four of which are crucial to comprehending the
relationship between FERPA and sections 1415(k)(9)(B) and
1417(c). First, FERPA allows school districts to disclose education
records, pursuant to state statute, to officials specified in such
statute, where the disclosure "concerns the juvenile justice system"
and relates to the system's capacity to "effectively serve the student
whose records are released."'  If the relevant state statute was
41 See, e.g., Walters, 519 U.S. at 209 (explaining that "[sitatutes must be
interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect"); Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (discussing that "[o]ur cases
consistently have expressed a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision
so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment"); Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985)
(interpreting an act, "in light of the elementary canon of construction that a
statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative").
42 See infra Part ILI.A (discussing the statutory construction rule against
implicit repeal).
43 See Perry A. Zirkel, Disclosure of Student Records: A Comprehensive
Overview, THE SPECIAL EDUCATOR, Mar. 28, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Zirkel,
Disclosure of Student Records].
44 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E) (1994). The corresponding regulation provides
for the disclosure of records to State and local officials or authorities to whom
this information is:
(A) Allowed to be ... disclosed pursuant to State statute adopted
before .. .1974, if the .. .disclosure concerns the juvenile justice
system and the system's ability to effectively serve the student whose
records are released; or (B) Allowed to be ... disclosed pursuant to
State statute adopted after... 1974, subject to the requirements of § 99.38.
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passed after November 19, 1974, schools may only disclose the
student's records "prior to adjudication"-i.e., prior to the finding
of delinquency.45 Further, for statutes enacted after November 19,
1974, recipient officials must certify in writing that they will not
disclose the student's education records to a third party without
consent, except as allowed by state law.
46
Second, FERPA allows schools to disclose a student's educa-
tion records in an emergency if it is "necessary to protect the
health or safety of the student or other persons. 47 According to
a United States Department of Justice handbook, "[o]n-campus
disruptions that constitute criminal acts" fall within this excep-
tion.48
34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(5)(A) (1999) (emphasis added). The regulation also
provides the conditions that apply to disclosure of information as permitted by
State statute adopted after 1974 concerning the juvenile justice system, namely,
permitting an educational agency or institution to disclose education records
under 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(5)(i)(B) and requiring "officials and authorities to
whom the records are disclosed ... [to] certify in writing to the educational
agency ... that the information will not be disclosed to any other party, except
as provided under State law, without the prior written consent of the parent of
the student". 34 C.F.R. § 99.38 (1999). Note, however, that this exception does
not appear to apply to students who face charges in an adult criminal justice
system. See Thomas A. Mayes et al., The Intersections of Special Education Law
and the Juvenile Justice System, Presentation at the Education Law Association's
Forty-Fifth Annual Conference (Nov. 5, 1999). For more information on FERPA
and the juvenile justice system, see MICHAEL L. MEDARIS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SHARING INFORMATION: A GUIDE TO THE FAMILY EDUCATIONAL
RIGHTS AND PRIVACY ACT AND PARTICIPATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS
(1997).
4' 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E)(ii)(I) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.38(a) (1999).
"20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(E)(ii)(II) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.38(b) (1999).
4' 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(10) (1999).
Professor Clark listed this FERPA exception and others in her article. See Clark,
supra note 16, at 7. Although she noted some of FERPA's exceptions, she did
not show how they relate to the disclosures required by section 1415(k)(9)(B) or
how that impacts her analysis of this section. This Article questions her
statements for several other reasons. First, she failed to acknowledge that
education records may be disclosed to juvenile justice authorities under certain
circumstances. Second, she did not state that schools, before complying with a
court order or subpoena, must provide parents with notice.
48 MEDARIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 7.
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Third, FERPA provides that records made and maintained by
a "law enforcement unit" of the district (such as an officer assigned
to patrol a school's grounds) and used solely for law enforcement
purposes are excluded from FERPA's definition of "education
records., 49 To the extent that a school district uses this law
enforcement unit record exception to FERPA's confidentiality
provision to convey records that are required to be disclosed under
section 1415(k)(9)(B), disclosure of these records under the IDEA
does not implicate any interest protected by FERPA, because
FERPA provides an express exception for disclosing such records
even if a school was not obligated to disclose these records under
the IDEA. In any event, these law enforcement unit records would
be only a portion of the "special education and disciplinary
records" that section 1415(k)(9)(B) would require a school to turn
over.
Finally, FERPA authorizes disclosures of education records
demanded in a court order or subpoena.50 By regulation, schools
must make a "reasonable effort" to give the protected party notice
of the subpoena or court order, before compliance, so the protected
party can challenge the subpoena or court order.5' Before a court
orders the disclosure of records, the person requesting the order
may be required to demonstrate a need for them.52
As a result, these four exceptions to FERPA's confidentiality
provision occur in contexts in which the IDEA crime reporting
provision-section 1415(k)(9)-may effectively operate. In fact,
schools may "ensure' 5 3 that law enforcement authorities receive
a subject child's special education and discipline records while also
following FERPA as is mandated by the Department of Education's
9 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 99.8 (1999).
so 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(J) (1994).
Sl 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9) (1999). In certain cases, such advance notice is
not required if the recipient is ordered not to disclose the contents or existence
of the subpoena. Id. § 99.31(a)(9)(ii).
52 See Krauss v. Nassau Community College, 469 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (Sup.
Ct. 1983).
s3 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(1)
(1999).
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regulation implementing section 1415(k)(9).54 This is because
FERPA's exceptions would allow the records contemplated by
section 1415(k)(9)(B) to eventually reach law enforcement
authorities, while protecting legitimate student rights as well.5
That is, if one FERPA exception does not apply, another one
almost certainly will. Even if many of the FERPA exceptions do
not apply, the school district may still comply with section
1415(k)(9)(B) and its implementing regulation by requiring a court
order or subpoena to be obtained before releasing a special
education student's records. 56 This exception to FERPA contains
an element of judicial oversight, and, thus allows for disclosure
only after a court has considered the merits of legitimate privacy
interests asserted. Consequently, although the Department of
Education's regulation implementing section 1415(k)(9)(B) imposes
the barriers of FERPA consent to the required disclosures, those
barriers are not insurmountable.5 7 Thus, the Department's regula-
54 This Article assumes that some education and law enforcement profession-
als may question the wisdom of the regulation, as a matter of public policy.
Public policy considerations may carry weight when a court is asked to construe
an ambiguous statute. See Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117,
121 (1987); Summers, supra note 15, at 417-18. When an agency is interpreting
an ambiguous statute under its administration, however, it is vested with the
primary authority to make public policy choices. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (citing United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). The judiciary will rarely disturb these
choices.
15 Some of these legitimate student rights may be of constitutional import
because juvenile court defendants enjoy many of the same constitutional rights
as adult criminal defendants. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-59 (1967)
(holding that juvenile court defendants enjoy many of the same constitutional
rights as adult criminal defendants, including a right to notice of charges, to
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege
against self-incrimination).
56 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 1(a)(9) (1999) (permitting, with conditions, a records
disclosure if "the disclosure is to comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued
subpoena").
57 To comply with section 1415(k)(9)(B), a school might find itself
requesting a subpoena. Although this may seem somewhat awkward, this
demonstrates that it is entirely within a school district's power to comply with
FERPA and the IDEA simultaneously.
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tion harmonizes the two operative sections of the IDEA and
simultaneously honors their relevant underlying policies. This is
because schools retain their obligation to disclose certain records
regarding a special education student to law enforcement authori-
ties, as provided in section 1415(k)(9)(B), while respecting
legitimate privacy rights of such students. That is, any such
disclosures must comply with FERPA, so as to safeguard legitimate
student interests and satisfy section 1417(b). In this way, no word
or phrase is rendered a nullity.
Other considerations support the view that FERPA and sections
1415(k)(9)(B) and 1417(b) may be harmonized. Under FERPA,
most permitted disclosures to third parties are optional,58 although
other laws may require permitted disclosures or prohibit allowed
disclosures.59 Prior to the 1997 IDEA amendments and 1999
regulations, the IDEA regulations prohibited disclosure of education
records that FERPA would have otherwise allowed.6° Reading the
amended IDEA and regulation in context with the prior versions,
one may conclude that the amended IDEA now requires certain
disclosures that FERPA already permits under its exceptions, but
nothing more. Under this reading, which supports the Department
of Education's regulation, all provisions of FERPA and the IDEA
retain meaning and purpose.
58 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (1999) (providing the conditions under which a
school "may" disclose otherwise protected information).
'9 See generally Mawdsley, supra note 2 (reviewing the case law that has
developed in litigating the rights of parents and students who have either been
denied access to student records or whose records have been released in violation
of FERPA); Walker & Steinberg, supra note 2 (providing an overview of
relevant federal and state confidentiality laws); Zirkel, Disclosure of Student
Records, supra note 43, at 1 (explaining that FERPA has two types of protection:
"one which prohibits the disclosure of personally identifiable information that is
contained in the student's record and the other that assures access for the parent
or the student," and providing a checklist of legal forms of disclosure without
written parental consent).
60 34 C.F.R. § 300.571 (1999). See also 34 C.F.R. pt. 300, Attachment 1-
Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, at 12,631 to 12,632
(1999) (noting this anomaly); Mawdsley, supra note 2, at 913-14 (same); Zirkel,
Caught in the Collision, supra note 2, at 429 n.2 (same). For a case applying the
prior regulations, see Sean R. v. Board of Educ., 794 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn.
1992).
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1II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
When construing a statute, a court will commonly look at the
statute from several additional perspectives if a close examination
of the text fails to resolve the dispute. These additional consider-
ations include considerations of the statute's purpose, examining
the statute in light of constitutional commands, and reviewing the
statute's legislative history. This final section examines section
1415(k)(9)(B) from these additional vantages.
A. Construing the IDEA Against FERPA's Implicit Repeal
The rule against implicit repeal, another rule of statutory
construction, provides additional support for the Department of
Education's regulation. Although a more recent statute will
occasionally override an earlier statute, this does not occur easily.
The rule requiring construction of a statute to avoid implicit repeal
provides that a newly enacted statute will not be presumed to
repeal any portion of a previously existing statute unless the two
are undeniably in conflict. 61 As a matter of fairness, the courts
expect Congress clearly to state when a law is to be repealed.62
Although enacted after FERPA, the 1997 IDEA amendments
contain no express indication of any intention to repeal any portion
of FERPA. Rather, the 1997 amendments to IDEA retain the
statutory language incorporating FERPA by reference. 63 Further-
61 See, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)
(recognizing that "so long as there is no 'positive repugnancy' between two laws,
a court must give effect to both"); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452-53
(1988) (explaining that "the doctrine [of] repeals by implication [is] strongly
disfavored, so that a later statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed an
earlier one unless there is a clear repugnancy between the two"); Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (explaining that the court chose not to
apply the unfavored repeal by implication doctrine to a statute, since it found no
irreconcilable conflict from which an intent to repeal may be inferred).
62 Summers, supra note 15, at 437-38.
63 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(8), 1417(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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more, FERPA and the IDEA are not in irreconcilable conflict.'
The Department's regulation, applying FERPA to disclosures of a
special education student's records to law enforcement authorities,
is a permissible reading of the underlying statutes because, among
other things, a very strong showing to the contrary has not been
made.
Other commentators, however, have not agreed. In a decision
prior to the effective date of the IDEA regulations, one special
education hearing officer reached a contrary conclusion, opining
that section 1415(k)(9) and FERPA were in irreconcilable con-
flict.65 Consequently, the hearing officer concluded that section
1415(k)(9) trumped FERPA as the "later enacted and more specific
statute."' This hearing officer's conclusion rests on an inadequate
view of FERPA.6 7 In his decision, the hearing officer made no
mention of FERPA's exceptions. When considering FERPA's
relationship to section 1415(k)(9)(B), one must take FERPA as a
whole-both the general rule and the specific exceptions.68 While
FERPA's general rule may conflict with section 1415(k)(9),
FERPA, considered as a whole, does not.69 As the two statutes as
a whole do not undeniably conflict with each other, the Depart-
ment's regulation is permissible.
64 See supra notes 29-54 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
1997 IDEA amendments and FERPA may be harmonized).
65 Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 IDELR 1118, 1122 (Tex. SEA 1998).
66 id.
67 In fairness to the hearing officer, his conclusions may have their root in
the unusual posture of the case before him and the arguments raised by the
parties. The district, not the parent, sought nondisclosure of records. The
student's parent asserted that the district violated IDEA when it failed to transmit
the student's records to law enforcement, relying on section 1415(k)(9).
Northside raised FERPA as a defense, arguing that the statute prevented it from
transferring records. Id.
68 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (recognizing
that "every Act of Congress should not be read as a series of unrelated and
isolated provisions").
69 See supra Part H (showing how FERPA and the IDEA may be read in
harmony).
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B. General Versus Specific Statutes
Another common rule of construction provides that, if two
conflicting statutes appear to apply in the same situation, the more
"specific" statute takes precedence over the more "general"
statute,70 regardless of order of enactment.71 One could argue
that section 1415(k)(9)(B) is the more specific of the two statutes,
as it covers only students with disabilities that are subjects of
school referrals to law enforcement. In contrast, FERPA covers
nearly all students, nearly all of the time. Assuming that section
1415(k)(9)(B) is the more specific of the statutes,72 it would take
priority over FERPA and regulations requiring compliance with
FERPA only to the extent that there was an unmistakable conflict.
The statutes, however, readily may be harmonized.73
C. Overarching Structure and Underlying Policy
In construing statutory language, courts routinely examine a
statute's structure and purpose. 74 Under this principle of construc-
70 See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445
(1987) (holding that "where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific
statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the
priority of enactment") (citations omitted); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S.
6, 15 (1978) (supporting the "principle [of giving] precedence to the terms of the
more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the
same concern").
7' See, e.g., Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445.
72 It is not axiomatic that section 1415(k)(9)(B) is more "specific" than
FERPA. Section 1415(k) makes a brief reference to records disclosures. In
contrast, FERPA has several sections of detailed rules regarding student record
disclosures. One may make a colorable argument that FERPA is the more
"specific" of the two statutes.
" See supra Part H (discussing how FERPA and the IDEA may be read in
harmony).
"4 See, e.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993)
(examining IDEA's purpose when construing one of its sections); Crandon v.
United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (stating that in "determining the
meaning of the statute... [the Court] look[s] not only to the particular statutory
language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and
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tion, a close examination of the IDEA's purpose and the policies
supporting the Department of Education's implementing regulation
further undercuts the contention that section 1415(k)(9)(B) creates
an "exception" to FERPA. Congress enacted the IDEA to ensure
access to a free appropriate public education after it concluded that
an intolerably high number of children with disabilities were
entirely excluded from public education. Many of these students
were excluded under the guise of discipline.76 In response, the
IDEA provides a comprehensive system of procedural safeguards
for children with disabilities and their families, including procedur-
al protections concerning discipline. 7 These protections are not
available to children without disabilities.78 In a statute that grants
children with disabilities increased protections, it would seem
incongruous to construe section 1415(k)(9)(B) to eliminate
FERPA's protections for those very children. The Department of
Education's regulation corresponds to the IDEA's structure and
purpose.
In addition to the IDEA's policy and purpose, one must
likewise consider the policies underlying FERPA. FERPA was
enacted, in part, to combat indiscriminate releases of student
records, such as releases to potential employers or credit card
issuers.79 Schools may release student records without consent
policy"); Summers, supra note 15, at 415-16, 426-27, 441-42 (explaining this
principle of statutory construction).
" Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187-92 (1982) (discussing the
IDEA and its goals).
76 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324-25 (1988) (citing Mills v.
Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972))
(discussing the exclusion of difficult disabled students and the "disciplinary
measures to bar children from the classroom").
77 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. IV 1998) (containing the IDEA's procedural
protections).
78 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 16, at 1-2 (noting a "dual standard" of
discipline).
71 See, e.g., Smith v. Duquesne Univ., 612 F. Supp. 72, 80 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(noting that "FERPA was adopted as a response to the growing nation-wide
concern" about privacy of school records); Red & Black Pub. Co. v. Board of
Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993) (citing Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp.
575, 590 (W.D. Mo. 1991)) (discussing the Buckley Amendment's purpose "to
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only in certain circumstances and to certain recipients. If section
1415(k)(9)(B) implicitly repealed FERPA, the privacy rights of
students with disabilities would be significantly compromised. The
only limitation placed on schools would be to transmit records to
"appropriate authorities,"80 which is an amorphous standard that
would almost certainly be breached by well-meaning educators,
either by doing too much or too little. By requiring that all record
releases under section 1415(k)(9)(B) comply with FERPA, the
Department of Education's regulation guards against the social
evils that FERPA addressed, as well as provides additional
guidance to school officials. The Department of Education's
regulation implementing section 1415(k)(9)(B) advances the
purposes of both the IDEA and FERPA.
D. Avoiding Constitutional Questions
As the Supreme Court of the United States illustrated in a case
involving the IDEA, courts construe statutes to avoid constitutional
difficulties. 1 Under this canon, courts presume that legislative
bodies write statutes in compliance with the Constitution.82
Statutes that exceed constitutional limitations are "void. 83 When
constitutional problems may be avoided by a reasonable construc-
control the careless release of educational information on the part of many
institutions"); S. JAMES ROSENFELD ET AL., EDUCATION RECORDS: A MANUAL
49-53 (1997) (describing FERPA's background); MARK G. YUDOF ET AL.,
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 376-77 (3d ed. 1992) (describing FERPA's
background, but additionally noting specific troublesome disclosures, such as to
employers or credit agencies); Mawdsley, supra note 2, at 905-912; Theumann,
supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the penalties for indiscriminate release of a
student's records).
go 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(B) (Supp. IV 1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(1)
(1999).
" Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7 (1993); accord
United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1957); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71-72 (2d ed. 1988). If a statute of question-
able constitutionality is clear and unambiguous and no other reasons for decision
are available, then the court will decide the constitutional issue. Id.
82 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 15, at 417, 451 (stating that "the courts
presume that the Congress intended to enact a valid statute").
83 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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tion of a statute, the courts are more likely to select the reading
that is on solid constitutional ground. 4 As read by Professor
Clark and others, special education students whom districts refer to
law enforcement would not be covered by FERPA; however, their
non-special education classmates subjected to law enforcement
referrals would still enjoy FERPA's protections. This interpretation,
allowing differential treatment based on disability, creates a
potential challenge under the equal protection guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments85 and federal statutes prohibit-
ing discrimination against people with disabilities. 86 The Depart-
ment of Education acknowledged that it adopted the pertinent
regulation to avoid this potential constitutional difficulty.87
4 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 7. This rule does not require an asserted statutory
reading to be unquestionably constitutionally defective; rather, the reading need
only engender a colorable constitutional dispute. See id.
85 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment constrains only the
federal government; in contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment operates on the
states. Compare Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) ("the Fifth
Amendment must be understood as retaining the power of the general govern-
ment, not as applicable to the states") with The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
10-11 (1883) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the powers of the
states). Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection
"Clause" as such, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause as containing an equal protection component.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); TRIBE, supra note 81, at 1437.
86 See, e.g., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting disability discrimination by entities receiving federal
funds); Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting discrimination against people with
disabilities by employers, state and local governments, and private entities
providing services to the public).
The Department of Education notes that schools may violate section 504 by
discriminating against children with disabilities in reporting criminal activities
(i.e., "only reporting crimes committed by children with disabilities"). 64 Fed.
Reg. 12,537, at 12,631. For more information on section 504 and the ADA, see
PERRY A. ZIRKEL & JEANNE M. KINCAID, SECTION 504, THE ADA, AND THE
SCHOOLS (1995).
87 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, at 12,631 (providing that "[t]o avoid this unconstitu-
tional result, this statutory provision must be read consistent with the disclosures
permitted in FERPA for the education records of all children").
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The Department's regulation also avoids a peculiar differentia-
tion among children with disabilities. Section 1415(k)(9)(B) applies
only when school authorities report an alleged crime. By its terms,
it does not apply when children with disabilities come to the
attention of law enforcement officials in other ways, such as by a
victim's complaint. Thus, the Department's regulation protects the
interests of all children with disabilities, regardless of the manner
in which their behavior comes under law enforcement scrutiny.
E. Legislative History
Although its use has become increasingly controversial, 8
legislative history is a common tool of statutory construction."
Even though courts and litigants frequently cite legislative history,
it is relatively unimportant in resolving the present matter for two
reasons. First, a strong text-based argument is almost always
preferred to an argument grounded in legislative history.' The
Department of Education's regulation stating that "[a]n agency
reporting a crime . .. may transmit copies of the child's special
education and disciplinary records only to the extent that the
transmission is permitted by the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act" is firmly grounded in a permissible reading of the
statute's text.91 Second, any reliance upon legislative history is of
little help in the present case. This is because there is almost no
legislative history regarding section 1415(k)(9)(B) and an argument
88 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 13, at 29-37 (criticizing the use of legislative
history); Summers, supra note 15, at 416-17, 438-40, 457-58 (noting the
controversy). See also, Nathan F. Coco, Comment, Has Legislative History
Become History?: A Critical Examination of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 20 J. CORP. L. 555, 561 (1995) (discussing
the Court's willingness to apply a "rigid textual approach" over an interpretation
of legislative history and stare decisis).
" See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575-76 (1995) (resorting
to legislative history to analyze a statute).
9 See Summers, supra note 15, at 434-41 (addressing the fact that "in recent
years the Court has seldom allowed such evidence deriving merely from
legislative history to override a credible ordinary meaning argument").
9' 34 C.F.R. § 300.529(b)(2) (1999).
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based on legislative history is nearly impossible.92 Two of the
most authoritative sources, the House and Senate Committee
Reports,93 offer no assistance. Without offering elaboration, the
reports merely restate the requirements of section 1415(k)(9)(B). 94
Furthermore, the floor debates concerning the 1997 IDEA amend-
ments contain only two references to the rule embodied in section
1415(k)(9)(B), neither of which mentioned FERPA.95 Thus, the
legislative history cannot be used to undermine the Department's
regulation.
CONCLUSION
After considering the various rules of statutory construction and
the policies and purposes underlying the IDEA and FERPA, this
Article concludes that the Department of Education's regulation is
clearly a permissible interpretation of section 1415(k)(9)(B). In
fact, given the strength with which the various rules of statutory
construction support the regulation in question, it is arguable that
the Department's construction is the only permissible reading of
section 1415(k)(9)(B). The subject regulation is valid law. Thus,
schools must comply with FERPA when transmitting a special
education student's records to law enforcement personnel.
92 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982)
(rejecting an argument that relied on legislative history, stating that the legislative
history was "too thin a reed on which to base an interpretation" of the IDEA).
93 Summers, supra note 15, at 424-25 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 43-44 (1986)).
94 H.R. REP. No. 95, at 113 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 111;
S. REP. No. 17, at 33 (1997).
9' See 143 CONG. REC. S4403 (daily ed. May 14, 1997); 143 CONG. REc.
S4315 (daily ed. May 12, 1997).
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